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Abstract
Awards—widespread in the corporate sector and elsewhere—are motivators that derive
their value from non-pecuniary concerns such as status and self-image. Quasi-experimental
panel data from the call center of a large international bank allow us to estimate the causal
impact on effort when receiving an award. The performance of winners proves to be sig-
nificantly higher than that of comparable nonrecipients after the award has been presented.
This increase in work effort is sizeable and robust. We investigate the various theories that
could explain the change in behavior. We find that image concerns most likely drive the
effect.
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“If an organization is going to function well,
it should not rely solely on monetary compensation schemes.”
Akerlof and Kranton (2005)
1 Introduction
Awards are increasingly popular in the corporate sector where managers consider innovative
human resource practices, such as awards, to be essential for firm competitiveness (Ichniowski
and Shaw 2003). In his book 1001 Ways to Reward Employees, Nelson (2005) provides ample
evidence of the number and variety of awards in companies. The prevalence and popularity
of awards in the corporate sector suggest that awards fulfill important functions in principal-
agent relationships.1 However, what exactly are awards and in what respects do they differ
from other kinds of incentives studied in the economic literature? In award schemes, an agent
is given a symbolic reward for good performance in combination with positive performance
feedback and social recognition from superiors and peers. While there is no universally accepted
definition of an award, the essential elements of those kinds of awards that we are interested in
consist of (1) the publicity of the winners, (2) a set of deliberately vague evaluation criteria,
(3) the unenforceability of awards, and (4) their tournament character. Although awards contain
features of other motivators, such as performance bonuses, pure feedback, gifts, praise, and
tournament prizes, they can be clearly distinguished from these other motivators. To date there
is no clear empirical evidence on the effect of awards on performance.2
1There is a major discrepancy between the practitioner literature and the academic literature with respect to
recognition programs like awards. On the one hand, the practitioner literature frequently advocates recognition
programs to improve safety ( Pardy 1999), reduce turnover (Davidson 1999; Wallsten 1998), increase job satis-
faction (Davidson 1999), improve performance and productivity (Schneier 1989), and reduce absenteeism (Boyle
1995). Furthermore, numerous books and manuals have been written detailing how to structure recognition pro-
grams (Townsend and Gebhardt 1997; Glassock and Gram 1999; Ventrice 2003; Podmoroff 2005). On the other
hand, there is a paucity of academic research targeted at recognition programs. This disparity is probably driven
by the lack of a clear definition about what constitutes a corporate award system from an academic point of view.
When practitioners discuss recognition programs, they refer to a variety of interventions that represent incentive in-
struments designed to reward at a low cost. From an academic point of view, this represents an ambiguous concept
with little theoretical basis, which is why academic research has focused on studying money, praise, and feedback
in isolation. Despite these concerns, we consider the study of awards worthwhile given their prevalence in the cor-
porate sector where they are used as instruments to induce effort in addition to monetary compensation schemes.
2Previously, when economists studied incentives in organizations, the focus was on incentives in the form of
monetary payments in exchange for performance in specific, measurable dimensions. This is illustrated by the
large literature on incentive pay to align the interests of principal and agent starting with the pioneering works by
Alchian and Demsetz (1972) and Jensen and Meckling (1976). Potential problems with performance pay have been
acknowledged and analyzed. One example is the discussion of multi-tasking problems (Holmstrom and Milgrom
1991). Starting with Lazear and Rosen (1981) the analysis of work incentives in the form of tournaments has
been a popular field of study. Another popular thread of the literature that is important for studying awards is the
literature on signaling (Spence 1973, 1974). Prendergast (1999) provides an overview of the economic literature
on the provision of incentives in firms. This study complements the traditional economic analysis with respect
to non-material incentives, ex-post effects of rewards, rewards for vague performances such as volunteering, and
spill-over effects of rewards for good performance in one job dimension to performance in another.
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This paper identifies the effect of receiving an award on subsequent employee performance
in the call center of a large international bank. Our data set is unique in that the awards stud-
ied are exogenous to the performance that we look at. Specifically, the awards are directed
towards valuable activities such as substituting for colleagues or making improvement sugges-
tions, which are uncorrelated with recorded performance in core call center activities such as the
number of calls answered. We test and corroborate the exogeneity of the awards and conclude
that they are indeed handed out randomly with respect to core performance. Hence, this feature
of the award system can be used as an exogenous source of variation and the set-up presents a
quasi-experiment.
Our analysis yields four main findings. First, we find that award winners substantially in-
crease their subsequent performance relative to both nonrecipients and their own previous per-
formance.3 This result is robust to alternative specifications that check the validity of the identi-
fying assumption and a variety of robustness checks. Thereby, we show that awards are valuable
motivators that can serve as additional incentive instruments in principal-agent relationships.
Second, we document the motivating power of non-pecuniary rewards.4 While economists have
a good understanding why and how financial rewards affect performance, we are still at the
beginning of understanding the motivating power of non-pecuniary rewards. As of now, there
is very little evidence on such non-financial rewards and this paper addresses this research gap.
Third, we report a positive spill-over effect from the rewarded on a job dimension that does not
qualify for an award: The receipt of an award for social activities like volunteering or making
improvement suggestions causes a statistically significant and sizeable increase in core call cen-
ter performance. Fourth, the data allow us to test and distinguish between different hypotheses
that could theoretically explain the performance increase. The analysis suggests that the effect is
driven by those individuals who previously performed poorly. This implies that image concerns
and the desire to live up to the honor rather than reciprocity or a change in employee identity are
driving the effect. This is in line with the literature on self-image concerns (Be´nabou and Tirole
2002, image motivation (Ariely et al. 2009) and peer effects (Mas and Moretti 2009; Bandiera
et al. 2009).
Transitory, ex-post effects of material rewards have been documented in the gift-exchange
3Malmendier and Tate (2008) also show how the receipt of a title, like “CEO of the Year,” affects subse-
quent performance. However, their paper is concerned with extra-organizational awards that are exogenous to the
principal-agent relationship of interest. These kinds of awards differ in essential ways from intra-organizational
awards. They are presented by a person or institution that is not the principal of the agent whose performance is
affected, for a different set of reasons, and they come with a different set of benefits for the recipient. Therefore,
their findings cannot be generalized to intra-organizational awards.
4Of course, there are some material benefits associated with the awards studied like the symbolic bonus associ-
ated with winning and the potential signaling value of the award. However, we provide evidence that the value of
the bonus is too small to explain the entire increase in performance and that the signaling value of this particular
award is negligible.
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literature (see, e.g., Fehr and Ga¨chter 2000 and Gneezy and List 2006). This study complements
previous research in this field with its focus on non-material rewards. Our finding of the positive
spill-over effect of an award for social activities on core performance adds to the literature on
motivation crowding out and multi-tasking that mainly focuses on negative spill-overs. This
study adds to the empirical principal-agent studies for which it has been lamented that they
only focus on very simple tasks (Prendergast 1999) and analyzes performance in a complex
work environment—a task that is characterized by many different job dimensions including
quality. Additionally, the significant behavioral effect of these social incentives also fits well
into the current discussion on the disparity between the impact of monetary incentives in the lab
and in the field.5
While the form that the non-material reward takes might be specific to this setting, the
essence of the results is of general interest. The fact that awards affect subsequent performance
in a job dimension that does not qualify for it indicates that social incentives might, more gen-
erally, substitute for or complement monetary incentive schemes in solving agency problems.
Awards may be of particular value in situations prone to multi-tasking or motivation crowding.
This has important implications for how workers respond to the provision of non-material work
incentives and sheds light on how compensation schemes can be enriched with non-material
components like awards.
We are aware of only a few other papers that explicitly study awards.6 Hansen and Weis-
brod (1972) and Frey (2005) address awards as incentives in general. Markham et al. (2002)
show in a quasi-experimental setting that the introduction of a public recognition program to re-
duce absenteeism decreases the latter by 52 percent. Moldovanu et al. (2007) study the optimal
design of status categories in organizations, assuming that agents care about their relative po-
sitions. Gavrila et al. (2005) describe the optimal solution for the management of awards over
time, considering that their incentive effect depends on the number of awards that are presented.
Besley and Ghatak (2008) analyze a principal-agent setting with status incentives, such as job
titles or awards. The decisive feature of these rewards is that they have zero marginal costs, so
it is incentive compatible for the principal to award them even if the payoff is not verifiable.
Neckermann and Frey (2008) and Neckermann and Kosfeld (2009) show that awards act as
incentives, significantly influencing performance before they are presented.
5While lab studies find a large behavioral effect of wage increases, effort reacts relatively little in the field. Some
authors (see, e.g., Dur 2008) argue that this divergence is caused by the fact that employers in the field typically
use motivators other than wages, for example, recognition, to signal kind intentions. Therefore, employees do
not reciprocate to wage increases in the field to the extent they do in the lab, where money is the only means of
signaling kind intentions.
6Of course, there are related literatures in organizational psychology and management (Stajkovic and Luthans
(2003) provide an overview of the organizational behavior literature). However, there is a general paucity of em-
pirical evidence, specifically on measured rather than stated behavior.
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Section II presents the data and the estimation technique. In Section III, the empirical find-
ings are discussed and Section IV concludes.
2 Data
The data set comprises information on awards as well as the employee performance of the 155
call center agents of a credit card service company of a large international bank and covers the
period from January 2004 to October 2007. The call center is responsible for handling customer
complaints and questions and consists of six workgroups, each with one manager.
2.1 The Performance Measure
The company records daily performance for a number of different performance dimensions,
starting in the second month of employment. On a monthly and yearly basis, these measures
are transformed into rankings and aggregated into a single performance index. In particular,
for each dimension, the percentage deviation between individual performance and the average
monthly performance of all the call center agents is calculated and changed into a rating between
5 (very good) and 1 (unsatisfactory), according to a matrix set up by the department head. As an
example, an agent that performs 120 percent of the average performance in a dimension receives
a rating of 5 in that dimension, and an agent whose performance is 80 percent or lower receives
a rating of 1. On a monthly basis, employees are informed about their rating and about how
it compares to the average performance in the call center. The company uses the performance
measure for decisions about layoffs and promotions.
The relative nature of the performance measurement is an advantage for our study because
it ensures that all time-varying factors that affect the absolute performance of all call center
agents are excluded.7 Specifically, the measurement is not affected by an increase in the number
or difficulty of calls or by improvements in the technical infrastructure. Both of these factors
render absolute performance incomparable over time. In line with exerted effort, the relative
rating further ensures that a certain number of calls answered translates into a higher rating
in slow rather than in busy months. We use the same index as the company to ensure that our
7Theoretically, relative performance measures may have the downside that a change in ratings may not always
reflect corresponding changes in effort; hence, ratings may not be comparable across months. This is the case when
a variation in the average absolute performance causes a given effort to translate into different ratings in different
months. In our setting, however, absolute performance does not exhibit a systematic trend and typically changes
only very little between two months in all dimensions. Moreover, the nature of the task renders it highly unlikely
that employee fluctuation causes changes in ability distributions dramatic enough to have a sizeable impact on
absolute performance. Therefore, any change in absolute performance that we observe likely reflects changes in
working conditions that should be filtered out.
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performance measure corresponds to the company’s assessment. Because the company alters the
exact calculation of its performance index from time to time by adding and removing different
performance dimensions from it, a core performance measure was constructed in collaboration
with the call center manager. Our performance index comprises the following six dimensions
that have been part of the company’s index in all of the periods covered:8
1. Calls Taken Per Hour: Average number of phone calls handled per hour.
2. Call Handling Time: Average length of phone call.
3. After Call Worktime: Average amount of time needed to process the request after the call
has been ended.
4. Transfer Rate: The average ratio between calls handled by the employee and the number
of phone calls that were transferred to colleagues or other service units.
5. Lates: Number of days on which the employee showed up late for work.
6. Quality: Quality of client handling is assessed both externally and internally.9
Of these dimensions, only the dimension Lates is not evaluated relatively, but according to
an absolute scale (no absence corresponds to a rating of 4, one absence to a rating of 3, and more
than one absence to a rating of 1). The resulting six ratings are then combined to a single overall
rating, which provides an overall assessment of performance. It captures all the relevant trade-
offs the company faces, ensuring that employees do not improve their rating, for instance, by
answering more calls at the expense of a higher transfer rate. Therefore, the performance can-
not be captured by analyzing the performance in individual performance dimensions. Rather, the
index must be used. It is constructed according to the same weighting scheme used by the com-
pany.10 Specifically, Quality enters with a weight of 50 percent and the five other dimensions
8The company’s changes in the index do not reflect systematic and sustained improvements of performance
evaluation, which would have suggested that we should use the changing index too. Rather all dimensions that are
not captured in our core rating were added and removed at various instances. Examples are the two dimensions
Training, which measures an employee’s performance in in-house training courses, and Write off Policy, which
measures the degree to which employees follow company guidelines on goodwill issues. Both dimensions were in
the company’s index only in 2006.
9The external and the internal component of the rating each account for 50 percent of the quality rating. Internal
quality is assessed by a manager by periodically monitoring the conversations of each agent. The assessment
follows a clear set of rules and guidelines that leave virtually no room for subjectivity. Evaluation criteria are,
for example, whether the agent correctly introduces herself and asks the right set of questions in the prescribed
order. The external quality rating is generated by an outside company that conducts surveys with the company’s
customers.
10The addition and deletion of performance dimensions in the company’s indices in different years were ac-
companied by changes in the weights of the individual dimensions. However, the relative weights of the six core
performance dimensions remained basically identical throughout the entire time period covered.
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Figure 1: Distribution of Performance Ratings Against a Normal Distribution
with 10 percent each. The weighting scheme suggests that the company places equal emphasis
on technical measures, such as the number and durations of calls, and content measures, which
capture the actual interaction between employee and customer. The management confirmed that
our core index captured overall performance well and that no important performance dimension
was neglected. Figure 1 exhibits the distribution of performance ratings.
The performance ratings are approximately normally distributed with an average of 3.02
and a standard deviation of 0.66 and do not exhibit a time trend. The mean and variation cor-
roborate the objective, quantitative nature of our performance data, as subjectively determined
evaluation data typically cluster around high values (on the leniency bias see, e.g., Murphy and
Cleveland 1995; Yariv 2006) and may cause endogeneity problems because managers might
assess award-receiving individuals more favorably. The resulting index represents a weighted
average of quantitative performance measures. Thus, we can treat the rating as cardinal because
it takes on many different values and does not have the quality of an ordinal grading scheme.
2.2 The Awards
The company has a variety of awards. These are called the Thank You Reward, theGold Reward,
the Platinum Reward, the President Reward, Employee of the Month, and Employee of the Year.
The requirements for qualifying for these awards increase from Thank You Reward to Employee
of the Year. While a Thank You Reward, an email notification of the recipient and a letter sent
to the employee’s home address, allows a spontaneous exchange of thanks among colleagues,
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the President Reward remunerates activities that have benefited the company as a whole; these
require approval by the CEO and come with a personal congratulation by the department head.
The winners of Employee of the Month and Employee of the Year are selected by a reward
committee and the CEO from among the winners of the Platinum and President Rewards. For
all awards, there is a close connection between effort and likelihood of nomination, so that
individuals can actively pursue winning an award. The award program of the company has been
in place since 2001. Therefore, we cannot estimate how the presence of the award system per
se changes performance because there is no control group without awards. Rather, this ex-ante
incentive effect of awards is part of the baseline motivation of each employee and constant
throughout the period of our study.11
While our data set contains information on the winners of all awards other than the Thank
you Reward, only the Gold Reward lends itself to a statistical examination because there are too
few observations of call center agents winning the other, more prestigious awards. TheGold Re-
ward remunerates exceptional efforts that benefit the entire work group. Examples of behaviors
that qualify for a Gold Reward are volunteering as a substitute during vacation times, initiat-
ing and implementing team events, making improvement suggestions, and helping others with
good advice. The company encourages employees to engage in these activities because they are
important for its efficient functioning. Nominations can be made by colleagues as well as super-
visors.12 An award is presented by the call center manager in front of the worker’s colleagues
in the middle of the following month. Award winners, as well as their colleagues, only learn
about the award at that ceremony. There is no additional announcement of the award winners;
however, the management tries to present the award when many colleagues are on hand. The
award is accompanied by a certificate for the wall, which serves as a reminder and ensures that
agents not present when the award is bestowed learn about it. Further, it comes with a symbolic
bonus of around $ 150, which equals about 3 percent of monthly income. Importantly, awards
are not presented for the performance used as the dependent variable in our analysis. In fact,
core performance is uncorrelated with the activities that lead to an award. Awards are there-
fore exogenous, and their causal effect on core performance can be identified by comparing
the performance of winners and nonrecipients subsequent to winning. If awards depended on
performance, they would always be—at least, in part—a reflection of good performance, and
11This incentive effect potentially changes with winning an award. One might argue that the motivation to
win decreases once an award has been won. However, such a potential change in baseline motivation renders the
detection of a positive change in performance caused by the receipt of an award more difficult.
12About half of the nominations come from group supervisors and the other half from colleagues. The reasons
provided for the nominations do not differ systematically between those by supervisors and colleagues. The Human
Resources Department communicates the criteria for nominations well, so almost all nominations result in an
award. Interviews with group managers and employees further suggest that employees deserving an award are not
ignored, especially as so many individuals can nominate.
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a careful creation of control groups would be necessary to identify the causal effect.
The data set covers 46 months from January 2004 to October 2007. Each month, the em-
ployees had the opportunity to win Gold Rewards (Gold Reward January 2004 to Gold Reward
October 2007). Overall, 158 Gold Rewards were presented to the 155 call center agents. As
expected, the distribution is skewed to the right. Two agents received a total of eight Gold Re-
wards, whereas 76 got none.13 These numbers suggest that the award is sufficiently scarce for
it to be valuable to its recipients, and the sample is well balanced between winners and nonre-
cipients because about half of the agents never received an award. On average, 3.4 awards are
presented per month with a minimum of zero and a maximum of 11.
2.3 Further Data Information
The call center agents are paid a fixed monthly wage of CHF 4,500 (about $4,500). The exact
sum the individual receives depends on her level of experience, knowledge of languages, and
length of employment at the call center. The Gold Reward complements the company’s salary
scheme because it incentivizes activities such as substituting for colleagues or organizing team
events that are not remunerated as part of the fixed wage. The management asserted that re-
ceiving a Gold Reward had no effect on future promotion decisions and award winners did not
receive special attention, training, or other advantages, for which we cannot control. Hence,
although in-house training may increase productivity, it is not correlated with winning awards
and therefore does not cause systematic biases of the awards’ impact on performance.
3 Awards and Performance
3.1 Empirical Specification
Gold Rewards are directed towards behaviors such as supporting colleagues and organizing
team events that are not captured in the core performance rating. Hence, we make the identi-
fying assumption that the probability of winning an award is decoupled from an agent’s core
performance and that the development of the performance of nonrecipients presents a valid
counterfactual for that of winners had they not won the award. The validity of this identifying
assumption will be tested as part of the analysis below. We estimate period-specific effects both
before and after a Gold Reward is won. The relative nature of our performance measure implies
that the performance rating is equal to three on average. Hence, we identify the effect via the
change in performance of the award-winning employees. We will show that the performance
13Figure A.1 in the Appendix shows the entire frequency distribution of the number of Gold Rewards per em-
ployee.
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of winners does not deviate significantly from the average prior to winning the award, but is
significantly higher in the month subsequent to winning given individual specific fixed effects.
Our effect is identified via the changes in the ratings of winners.
The following table presents an overview of the three dimensions used to identify and quan-
tify the effect of a Gold Reward on employee performance:
Table 1: Dimensions of Identification Strategy
Dimension Value Use
Time relative to event Before bestowal of Gold Rewardvs. after bestowal of Gold Reward
Allows testing whether the
performance of winners deviates from
the average performance prior to
winning.
Type of performance Core Performance vs. behaviorsthat qualify for a Gold Rewarda
Ensures exogeneity of event (Gold
Reward) on our performance
measure.
Treatment Winner of Gold Reward vs.nonrecipient
Identification of the size of the effect of
a Gold Reward on core performance.
a The Gold Reward recognizes exceptional efforts that are unrelated to core call center duties. Examples
of behaviors that qualify for a Gold Reward are volunteering as a substitute during vacation times or
implementing team events.
Under the identification strategy presented above, the causal effect of receiving an award on
employee performance is estimated by fitting the following equation to the data:
Yit = α +
T￿
τ=T
πτWiτ + µi + βXit + ξit. (1)
The dependent variable Yit represents the performance rating of employee i in period t.
Because Yit is constructed as the weighted average of the ratings in the individual performance
dimensions discussed above, it takes on many different values and can be treated as continuous.
The index τ denotes the time period relative to t and is measured in months. τ runs from −6 to
+6 and is normalized so that τ = 0 refers to the current month t; τ < 0 refers to months prior
to t; τ > 0 refers to months after t. The range of τ determines the size of the event window.
The indicator variable µi controls nonparametrically for employee fixed effects, such as level
of education and gender.14 Because the resulting panel is unbalanced, we use dummy variables
rather than fixed effects as controls for individual-specific effects.Xit is a vector of time-varying
14In principle, one could also control for time- and award-specific effects. However, the relative nature of our
performance measure already eliminates period-specific, exogenous shocks to performance. In addition, the Gold
Rewards in the individual months that we cover are identical, so there is no reason to expect independent award-
specific effects.
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observable characteristics of the individual. In our case this is the length of employment in the
call center and its squared term. α represents a constant, and ξit is a stochastic error term. To
calculate standard errors, we cluster on the workgroup level per year.15 Alternative ways of
adjusting standard errors are discussed below.
The key variables in this regression are theWiτ indicator variables.Wiτ equals 1 for a person
i who receives a Gold Reward τ from t, and zero otherwise. As the Gold Reward is open to all
employees in all periods, Wiτ captures all the relevant information because each employee is
either a winner or a nonrecipient in each month. The vector πτ are the parameters of interest in
this equation and capture the period-specific effects on performance of winning a Gold Reward
τ months from the current time period t as compared to not winning an award, conditional on
all covariates. By including an indicator variable for each period, the effect of being a winner
is allowed to vary with τ . For example, a coefficient π+2 = 0.5 means that the performance
of employees who won a Gold Reward two periods ago is 0.5 points higher than the one of
nonrecipients. The time series of the coefficients πτ around the event (τ = 0) allows us to detect
the causal effect of an award on performance. If the coefficients were significantly positive
before the award was presented, there would be concerns about reverse causality. In case the
performance of winners and nonrecipients is indistinguishable prior to an award for a large
number of periods, we can be confident that our identifying assumption holds.
As all individuals are winners or nonrecipients with respect to multiple awards, every
performance observation simultaneously helps to identify all 13 different πτ from π+6, the
performance of winners relative to nonrecipients six months prior to an award, to π−6, the
performance of winners relative to nonrecipients six months after an award.
3.2 Hypotheses
The effect of awards on subsequent performance is a priori theoretically ambiguous. On the
one hand, core performance might be unaffected because the awards recognize activities that
have nothing to do with it. For the same reason, increasing core performance does not increase
the likelihood of winning the award again. Hence, the awards provide no direct incentives to
increase core performance. Additionally, because awards are predominantly nonmonetary re-
wards there are no relevant income effects. On the other hand, performance might decrease,
15We do not have obvious problems with grouped errors as the unit of observation corresponds with the unit of
variation, i.e., the award. However, clustering on workgroups accounts for possible correlations of ratings within
teams. As team composition varies between years due to employee fluctuation, workgroup-per-year clusters are
used. This also increases the number of clusters, which improves inference due to the asymptotic properties of the
clustering procedure (Kiefer 1980; White 1980).
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for example, because award winners rest on their laurels.16 Alternatively, performance might
increase sustainably when the award intensifies identity in the form of workers’ self-images as
job holders of the award-winning employees with the company (Akerlof and Kranton 2005).
Performance also might increase for a short period subsequent to winning when award win-
ners reciprocate the recognition (Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger 2004 and Falk and Fischbacher
2006).17 The following analysis will provide insights into which of these theories prevails here.
3.3 Descriptive Statistics
The data set comprises a total of 1202 individual-month observations.18 In total we observe 147
individuals, 63 percent of the agents in the sample are female, and the agents remain in the
sample for 12.84 months on average. On average about half of all the men and women in the
sample receive a Gold Reward. Further descriptive statistics are presented in table A.1 in the
appendix. In the regressions that ensure clean award windows, there are 39 persons with one
award and two persons have with two awards.
3.4 The Performance of Winners and Nonrecipients
Figure 2 shows the the raw data, ie. the average, quarterly performance of winners and nonre-
cipients around the award.19 The performance of winners has a higher standard error and moves
around more because there are fewer observations for the winners as compared to nonrecipients.
Naturally, the average, mean-corrected performance rating of the large number of nonrecipients
centers around zero. The illustration suggests that the performance of winners and nonrecipients
is indistinguishable prior to an award and that the performance of winners increases relative to
nonrecipients in the period following the award.
16Malmendier and Tate (2008) show that CEOs who win titles, like “CEO of the Year,” subsequently underper-
form both relative to their prior performance and relative to a matched sample of non-winning CEOs.
17The large literature on gift exchange has documented transitory increases in effort after the reward, typically
in the form of money, was transferred to the recipient (Fehr and Ga¨chter 2000 and Gneezy and List 2006 provide
surveys on lab and field experimental evidence).
Theories on other social motivators like feedback (Suvorov and van de Ven 2006) or manager-employee relations
(Dur 2008) also suggest a positive ex-post effect. However, these mechanisms should not be important in our
setting. Theories that posit a positive cross-derivative between status and effort (e.g., Auriol and Renault 2008)
would also predict an increase in performance after the receipt of an award. The sustainability of this increase
would then depend on whether and for how long the award increases the relative standing of the recipient.
18The initial data set comprised some additional id-month observations that were lost because one or more
performance dimensions were not recorded in a particular month due to vacation, sick leave, or failure of the
manager to assess the dimension Quality. Further, some observations were dropped to ensure clean event windows.
This means that those id-month observations are included where at most one of the winner dummies,Wiτ , equals
one to eliminate confounding effects of other awards received in the event window.
19The performance is corrected for individual fixed effects to ensure the comparability with the results of the
regressions presented below.
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Figure 2: Quarterly Performance of Winners and Nonrecipients Prior to and After an Award
(With Standard Error Bars)
This first impression is confirmed in a regression analysis that controls for individual fixed
effects and length of employment and accounts for potential serial correlation. Table 2 presents
the results when estimating equation (1) for two different subsets of employees. The first model
includes all id-months observations with clean event windows. This means that those id-month
observations are included where at most one of the winner dummies,Wiτ , equals one to elimi-
nate confounding effects of other awards received in the event window. Model 2 only includes
the id-month observations of those employees that receive at least oneGold Reward during their
time of employment at the company. As the entire sample is now comprised only of individu-
als that have received Gold Rewards at different points in time, Gold Reward winners and the
nonrecipients that form our control group are homogeneous in their underlying unobservable
characteristics by definition. Model 3 uses the same sample as model 2 and tests the sensitivity
of our results with respect to the weighting of the different performance dimensions in con-
structing the index. The dependent variable in this model is an index in which all performance
dimensions were weighted equally.
According to model 1, the performance of winners is 0.24 or 7.4 percent higher than that of
nonrecipients one month after the award. This is equivalent to an increase of performance by
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Table 2: Impact of an Award on Performance (Six Months Before and After the Event)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
π−6 −0.055 −0.069 0.035
(−0.54) (−0.67) (0.42)
π−5 0.123 0.117 0.152
(1.37) (1.31) (1.70)
π−4 0.100 0.098 0.135
(1.40) (1.47) (1.64)
π−3 0.076 0.080 0.083
(0.76) (0.84) (0.84)
π−2 −0.013 −0.008 −0.035
(−0.13) (−0.09) (−0.50)
π−1 −0.028 −0.020 −0.083
(−0.39) (−0.29) (−0.98)
π0 −0.034 −0.022 −0.067
(−0.51) (−0.33) (−0.85)
π+1 0.234∗∗ 0.246∗∗ 0.198∗∗
(2.73) (2.96) (2.18)
π+2 0.015 0.035 −0.051
(0.12) (0.29) (−0.43)
π+3 0.172 0.192 0.117
(1.03) (1.19) (0.80)
π+4 −0.006 0.017 0.000
(−0.05) (0.17) (0.00)
π+5 −0.050 −0.022 −0.022
(−0.85) (−0.40) (−0.39)
π+6 0.005 0.033 −0.035
(0.05) (0.28) (−0.32)
Tenure 0.013 0.009 0.009
(1.76) (0.95) (0.84)
Tenure2 −0.000 −0.000 −0.000
(−0.98) (−0.81) (−0.69)
Constant 3.209∗∗∗ 3.228∗∗∗ 3.572∗∗∗
(37.29) (34.91) (42.00)
Observations 1202 667 667
R2 0.576 0.563 0.648
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < .10, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
0.36 standard deviations. This increase is substantial, especially when taking into account the
large number ofGold Reward winners at the call center and that we use performance in a job di-
mension that is not incentivized with the award as the dependent variable. Two months after the
award, the difference in performance becomes insignificant. The fixed effects of winners are,
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on average, higher than that of agents who never receive an award.20 Consistent with our ho-
mogeneity assumption, we find that, in each of the six months prior to an award, recipients and
nonrecipients have very similar performance ratings when the different level effects are taken
into account. Indeed, their mean-adjusted performance ratings are statistically indistinguishable
for this relatively large number of periods. The long time series of insignificant coefficients
prior to winning an award supports our identifying assumption that awards are exogenous to
the performance in core call center duties.21 As an additional robustness check, we regressed
the likelihood of receiving an award on lagged performance levels and do not find a statistically
significant relationship.
The results for model 2 closely resemble those of model 1. Hence, our result is robust
with respect to the inclusion and exclusion of particular kinds of employees and the choice of
the specific control group. The control variable job tenure does not have a robust statistically
significant effect on performance.
One may be concerned that the particular construction of the index drives our result. We use
the index rather than performance in the individual performance dimensions for two reasons:
First, the use of individual performance dimensions is problematic, as one cannot interpret and
increase or decrease in any individual performance as an improvement or a deterioration of per-
formance because there are important trade-offs. For example, an agent can increase the number
of calls taken per hour by increasing her transfer rate or being less diligent in the documenta-
tion of the process reflected in after call worktime. Second, the index that we use represents the
performance measure used by the company. Hence, our performance measure reflects what the
company considers to be an appropriate assessment of performance. To check the robustness
of our result, we constructed a different index that weights all performance dimensions equally.
The results are reported in model 3, which confirms that our results are not driven by the large
20One could argue that differences in ability drive the positive correlation between award-relevant and core per-
formances. Then, efforts in these two performance dimensions may be substitutes and the increase in performance
after the award does not present a true additional performance increase but merely a reshift in effort allocation.
To test this, we regress the likelihood of receiving an award (our proxy for effort in the award-relevant activities)
on lagged performance for different levels of the individual fixed effect (our proxy for ability), separately. In case
the argument were true, one should find a negative correlation between core performance and the likelihood of
receiving an award for any given ability level. However, this is not the case. Past performance is not significantly
related to the likelihood of receiving an award in any regression. Hence, awards are not conditional on core per-
formance. One could further argue that awards are given to the productive types not because they actually engage
in voluntary work behaviors, but because they collude with supervisors to gain additional compensation for their
high performance. However, we can show that within the first five months at the company, employees who receive
an award exhibit a higher core performance than those who never receive an award (Mann-Whitney test p-value:
.07, one-sided). As employees at the beginning of their careers lack the necessary familiarity with their supervisors
and the unwritten rules of the company, they actually earn their awards with voluntary work behaviors rather than
politicking.
21There is also no indication for an Ashenfelter Dip here because the award is independent of the performance
in core call center tasks (Ashenfelter, 1978).
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weight of 50 percent of Quality in the index. The pattern of performance, both in terms of the
size of coefficients as well as significance levels is similar to that in the other models presented.
A closer look at performance in the individual performance dimensions shows that the overall
result (i.e., the sizes of the coefficients and their significance levels) is reflected in the Quality
dimension and, to a lesser extent, in the dimension After Call Worktime (see table B.1 in the ap-
pendix). Performance also increases in all other dimensions, but the effect size and the specific
lags that exhibit significant coefficients differ between dimensions and are not strong enough to
have a significant effect on the overall rating. However, these findings should be interpreted with
care because only the aggregate rating is a useful measure of performance due to the trade-offs
between the different dimensions.
RESULT 1. Awards significantly increase the performance of recipients subsequent to winning.
3.5 Development of Performance Over Time
In this section, we look at whether performance increase of winners relative to nonrecipients
is driven by an increased performance of the winners or by a performance drop of the non-
recipients. Comparing the performance of winners between the month of the award and the
subsequent month (i.e., periods τ = 0 and τ = +1), the t-test suggests that performance is
significantly higher in the month after the award than in the month of the award. In contrast, the
performance in the month prior to the award is not statistically different from that in the month
of the award. The average increase in performance between the month prior to the award and
the month after the award is 0.14 (α = 0.05, p-value: .04, two-sided). There is no statistically
significant difference in performance between any of these three months for nonrecipients (i.e.,
between the periods τ = −1, τ = 0, and τ = +1). Given that each individual’s performance
rating is determined relatively by comparing her performance with the average, it is no surprise
that the average, mean-corrected performance rating of the large number of nonrecipients cen-
ters around zero. This was even true when the absolute performance of these agents changed.
Hence, the increase in the performance of the winners may be caused by a worse performance
of the nonrecipients. Because there is large number of nonrecipients each month, this would
be reflected in a deterioration of absolute performance. However, this is not the case. Absolute
performance over the four years stays relatively stable. In particular, we do not detect a general
time trend in absolute performance nor in any individual performance dimension (Table A.2 in
the appendix provides an overview). Therefore the significant increase in the in the ratings of
the winners represents higher winner effort.
RESULT 2. Receiving an award improves the performance of winners, whereas the performance
of nonrecipients remains unaffected.
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3.6 Why Do Winners Work Harder?
The observed increase in performance subsequent to winning an award could be attributed to
induced feelings of organizational commitment. Akerlof and Kranton (2005), for instance, state
that employees who identify with their company perform better and that employers can actively
influence whether employees identify with the company. Specifically, initiation rites, such as
award ceremonies, can be used to change self-perception.22 Our evidence, however, suggests
that a Gold Reward does not cause a sustainable change in preferences (i.e., employee identity)
because the effect is limited to the month subsequent to winning. Psychological evidence also
suggests that a positive event, which induces a good mood, increases subsequent voluntary be-
havior when this is in line with the positive cognitions evoked by the event ( Isen and Simmonds
1978). While this mechanism could explain an increase in the behavior that lead to the award,
it cannot explain an increase in core call center performance.
The Hawthorne effect (Mayo 1933; Roethlisberger and Dickson 1939; Levitt and List 2009
provide a recent critical assessment), on the other hand, cannot explain the documented impact
of the award. It argues that any intervention, irrespective of its content, can increase performance
due to the additional attention of the managers devoted to the workers as part of the intervention.
In our study, however, both the treatment and the control group are subject to the award system,
which has been in place for a number of years. Further, the data that we use were collected as
part of normal business procedures prior to us contacting the organization. Hence, nothing out
of the ordinary happened in the period that we cover. General effects related to the potential
motivating power of managerial and peer attention are discussed below.
At the same time, receiving an award can also induce reciprocal actions (e.g., Fehr and
Ga¨chter 2000; Kube et al. 2008). The transitory effect that we find is in line with the evidence on
gift exchange literature (e.g., Gneezy and List 2006). According to reciprocity theories typically
used to explain these effects (e.g., Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger 2004; Falk and Fischbacher
2006), winners increase their efforts to reciprocate to the monetary bonus or the value of the
gift associated with winning the Gold Reward. However, it is highly unlikely that the entire
effect we document is driven by reciprocity to the monetary value of the bonus or gift. First, the
amount is small—only 3 percent of the average monthly salary of around CHF 4,500. Second,
field studies have shown that the wage elasticity of workers’ outputs ranges from roughly 0.15
to 0.44 (Fehr et al. 2008). Thus, the observed increase of 7.5 percent would require a wage
increase between 15 to 50 percent. This corresponds to a bonus of between CHF 750 and 2,500,
22According to Akerlof and Kranton (2005), cognitive dissonance (Festinger 1954) is the underlying psycholog-
ical mechanism that drives this development of loyalty. Applying cognitive dissonance theory to awards implies
that individuals, who have publicly accepted an award and thereby the rules and values of the organization, improve
their views and valuation of the organization.
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which is much higher than the actual amount of CHF 150. Any effect related to the agents
reciprocating to the social recognition value of the award is in line with our argumentation that
purely social rewards influence performance.
Another explanation for the observed increase in performance may be the increased expo-
sure of the award winner in the month of his or her award. Recipients may feel a need to live
up to the honor of having received an award for their voluntary work behaviors, and this may
affect their core performances. This effect should be stronger for award winners whose core
performance was below average prior to the award. The data allow us to test this hypothesis
by separating the winners into two groups: those individuals who performed below average in
τ = 0 and those who performed above average. Looking at how much performance increases
between the month of the award and one month later, we find that, on average, the rating of
low performers increases by 0.58 (+23 percent), whereas the performance of high performers
decreases by 0.17 (−5 percent). The one-sample t-test indicates that both coefficients are highly
significantly different from zero. This differential impact of winning an award supports the no-
tion that the increase in performance is caused by winners wanting to live up to the award with
respect to core performance (see Ariely et al. 2009; Be´nabou and Tirole 2002 on self-image
concerns and image motivation). At the same time, the differentiated effect renders it highly
unlikely that reciprocity or organizational commitment causes the increase because this should
apply to under- and over-performing winners in the same manner. However, the differentiated
effect could also be caused by mean reversion. Individuals who achieve a very good perfor-
mance rating likely were lucky that month. Their next draws are unlikely to meet or exceed prior
realizations, causing their individual performance to revert to the population mean. Therefore,
we use a longer time horizon to classify individuals as high- or low-performing. Specifically,
we look at τ = +2, τ = +1, and τ = 0. Individuals that perform worse than average in two or
three of those periods are classified as low performers. Low-performing winners increase their
rating by 0.29 (+11 percent) (which is significantly greater than zero at the 1 percent level),
while the rating of high-performing winners changes by 0.03 (+1 percent) (not significantly
different from zero).23 Therefore, while there is some mean reversion going on, the differential
impact of awards on the rating of high- and low-performing agents is robust.
That the documented increase in core performance is mainly caused by the catching up of
previously low-performing agents is illustrated in Figure 3. The figure shows that all perfor-
mance ratings that were below 2.8 in the month prior to the award shift up and center around
the average performance. This supports our finding that reciprocity does not drive the perfor-
23The average rating of high performers in the month when they win an award is 3.52 (std. dev. 0.32), which
suggests that the performance of high performers is not bounded from above, and they have the scope to increase
their performance the same as low performers.
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mance increase because if reciprocity was the mechanism all winners should increase their core
performance subsequent to winning irrespective of whether they performed well or poorly prior
to the award.
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Figure 3: Kernel density of the winners’ performance before and after the award
Arguments explaining the observed effect without resorting to social motives are unlikely to
play a role here. The award system is well established, and the criteria are clear to all employees.
Therefore, handing out the award should not change the relevant information of the agents on
the type of behavior and the required effort level to win. Further, the small bonus of CHF 150
is unlikely to cause an income effect that could explain the result. Moreover, if there were any
income effect, it would affect performance in the opposite direction and only strengthen the
result that winning the award triggers employees to work harder. A Gold Reward has no impact
on future promotion decisions, and employees know that. Furthermore, a Gold Reward has no
value as a signal of ability and motivation. Managers and employees both confirmed that they
would not mention a Gold Reward in their CV. Any motive related to the agent trying to win
the award again also cannot explain the finding because any increase in core performance is by
definition of the award criteria not linked to a higher chance of winning another Gold Reward
because these reward activities are not captured in the core rating.
We can also rule out that the effect is caused by award winners focusing on those activities
that lead to the award at the expense of core performance prior to winning. If the argument were
true, the performance after the award would be the normal level of core performance, and win-
ners and nonrecipients would not be homogeneous despite the similarity of their performance
prior to the award. While such an effect could be imagined if one only looked at the three months
prior to an award—the maximum time span that an activity eligible for winning lasts—the long
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time series of insignificant performance differences prior to an award renders the conjecture
invalid. In addition, the difference in performance after an award should then also be sustained
for more than one month. The same holds for the argument that utility is concave in the number
of awards won. Then, award-winning employees may substitute effort for award-eligible activ-
ities by effort in core performance dimensions because they do not care as much about winning
another award. That employees are homogenous ex ante then simply reflects that prior to the
award everyone tries to win an award. However, if this argument were true, one should observe
an increase in absolute performance over time as more and more employees receive an award,
which is not the case. At the same time, the argument is hard to reconcile with the short-lived
nature of the effect.
Regarding the size of the effect, it is worth observing that the sizes of the documented effects
only present a lower bound due to three reasons specific to this study. First, the Gold Reward is
low in the hierarchy of awards at the company, and one would expect to find even larger effects
for the other awards. Second, awards at the company are presented for beneficial behaviors that
are not included in the company’s core performance measure, which we use as the dependent
variable. Thus, the estimated effect of awards on core performance presents only the spillover
effect of the presumably larger effect on those behaviors that are rewarded. One standard ob-
jection to award systems is that they induce individuals to exert unproductive efforts to increase
their chances of winning. Our result, however, provides evidence to the contrary, as we observe
an increase in productive effort. Hence, even if there were some rent seeking going on, it does
not come at the expense of productivity. Third, we only measure the impact of the award subse-
quent to being presented. However, the award system as such does have an incentive effect that,
while it cannot be captured in this study, probably has a substantial impact on the performance
of all employees as they work towards the award. In a field experiment, Neckermann and Kos-
feld (2009) find that the introduction of an award system increases performance by about 10
percent.24
3.7 Robustness
The following section addresses a variety of issues concerning the reliability of our results. As
is the case with most, if not all, event studies, our results exhibit serial correlation. However,
this issue does not affect our results because we estimate robust standard errors. Specifically, we
report the robust (Huber-White sandwich) estimates of variance that provide correct estimates
for any type of correlation within the observations of each panel/group. Moreover, Bertrand et
24Receiving an award may also have other beneficial side effects that cannot be measured as part of this study.
For example, one might conjecture that awards have an additional positive affect on the retention rates of the award
winners.
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al. (2004) show that, if the intervention variable is not serially correlated, OLS standard errors
are consistent, despite the positive serial correlation in the residuals. This holds in our study
because the average correlation of the independent variable over time for each individual is close
to zero. Serial correlation and heteroskedasticity are more extensively addressed, and additional
tests are reported in Appendix C. As a further robustness check we used the two-way cluster
approach (Cameron et al. 2006), which provides cluster-robust inference when there is non-
nested, two-way clustering. The two dimensions that we checked were id and month because
one could imagine errors to be clustered for all observations of one individual and within one
month. However, our results are robust to this test as Table C.1 in the appendix shows.
We already established above that the direction of causality runs from award to performance
by showing (1) that there is no significant difference between the performance of winners and
nonrecipients prior to an award and (2) that the results of models 1 and 2 are basically identi-
cal. Nevertheless, we additionally tested whether current or lagged performance determines if
a person receives aGold Reward. As expected, there is no significant effect of these variables on
the likelihood of receiving an award. Only the length of tenure has a significant impact, which
provides an additional rationale for including it in the regressions presented above. Third, the
results are robust with respect to the inclusion and exclusion of employees depending on the
number of Gold Rewards received. The results do not change with a variation in the event win-
dow size (we tested event windows ranging from plus/minus 3 to 12 months). In addition, the
inclusion of time fixed effects has no effect on the results because the relative rating already
eliminates any impact of time-varying changes in the business environment.
4 Conclusion
In general, the use of incentives is indispensable in principal-agent relationships within organi-
zations. Advances in behavioral economics have recently addressed and presented models of a
wide set of human motivations such as the desire for status and positive self-image. However,
awards as incentive instruments tapping a number of such motives have so far been neglected
in economics despite their widespread use in the corporate sector and elsewhere.
In a quasi-experimental set-up, this study shows that receiving an award for uncontractible,
voluntary work behaviors such as organizing team events or substituting for sick employees in-
creases core performance—those efforts that are more immediately linked with business success
by 7.5 percent when compared to nonrecipients. Hence, we show in the field that social incen-
tives have a sizeable and robust positive effect on employee performance. Moreover, rewards
influence behavior after they have been received, that is, beyond the incentive effect normally
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considered as people work towards receiving the reward.25 This clearly contradicts the notion
that awards only influence behavior due to their effect on future monetary income and that
awards only reflect high ability and performance, but do not cause it. Additionally, awards as
social incentives have a positive spillover effect on dimensions of the job that they do not target.
The richness of the data set allows us to distinguish between different hypotheses that could
theoretically explain the effect. Examples include reciprocity and a change in employee identi-
fication with the company. We conclude that the effect is driven by the desire to live up to the
honor.
One important implication of the study is that social incentives are valuable in incentivizing
types of activities that are desirable for the company, but not contractible. The vague nature
of awards, for instance, better corresponds to the vague nature of activities such as helping
colleagues or sharing knowledge. Therefore, employees may perceive social incentives to be
a more adequate reward for these kinds of activities than monetary bonuses that put a clear dollar
value on the exerted effort. Thereby, awards are less likely to reduce intrinsic motivation.26 At
the same time, multitasking problems may less likely occur. Moreover, social rewards may
have a positive impact on the work climate and the shared beliefs about appropriate kinds of
behavior. There is much scope for future research to investigate these and other issues. One
relevant question concerns the optimal number of awards and award categories. Additionally, a
deeper understanding of all channels through which awards affect performance might improve
our understanding of incentive provision in principal-agent relationships.
25Hence, the documented ex-post performance enhancement adds to the presumably positive impact on the
rewarded activity itself and the incentive effect of the award system per se.
26See, e.g., Frey 1997 and Be´nabou and Tirole 2003 on the crowding out of motivation.
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Appendix
A Descriptive statistics
Figure A.1: Distribution of Gold Rewards per Employee
Table A.1: Descriptive Statistics
Number of observations
Winners 431 36%
Nonrecipients 771 64%
Total 1202 100%
By gender Total Winner Nonrecipients
Men 488 41% 273 63% 441 57%
Women 714 59% 158 37% 330 43%
Total 1202 100% 431 100% 771 100%
Total awards in sample 43
Months covered 46
Average number of awards per year 11
Average number of awards per month 1
Awards per Month 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
Frequency 23 13 6 1 1 1 1
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Table A.2: Development of average absolute performance over time
2004 2005 2006 2007
Calls taken per hour 9.39 10.96 10.12 10.01
Call handling time 0:04:29 0:04:09 0:04:20 0:04:56
Quality 91.00% 83.93% 93.43% 94.77%
Transfer rate 7.63% 8.96% 8.25% 8.84%
After call worktime 26.58% 23.96% 26.42% 35.02%
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B Performance in the Individual Performance Dimensions
Table B.1: Effect of an award in the different performance dimensions
Calls taken Call Quality Late Transfer After Call
per hour Duration Rate Worktime
π−6 0.186∗ 0.143 −0.222 −0.011 0.183 0.055
(2.01) (1.06) (−1.26) (−0.06) (1.22) (0.22)
π−5 0.178 0.312∗∗ 0.059 0.019 0.046 0.376
(1.25) (2.51) (0.45) (0.17) (0.29) (1.57)
π−4 0.219 0.229 0.034 −0.078 0.115 0.349∗
(1.40) (1.47) (0.29) (−0.55) (0.49) (1.77)
π−3 0.152 0.061 0.068 −0.054 0.145 0.118
(0.93) (0.39) (0.54) (−0.34) (0.55) (0.49)
π−2 0.090 0.147 0.023 −0.307∗ 0.110 −0.281
(0.58) (0.90) (0.13) (−1.92) (0.38) (−1.67)
π−1 −0.043 −0.013 0.061 −0.403∗ −0.061 −0.063
(−0.33) (−0.08) (0.72) (−1.98) (−0.23) (−0.33)
π0 0.012 −0.028 0.030 −0.197 −0.237 −0.045
(0.10) (−0.14) (0.38) (−0.60) (−0.81) (−0.22)
π+1 0.199 0.350 0.303∗∗ −0.038 −0.133 0.445∗
(1.51) (1.47) (2.52) (−0.17) (−0.69) (1.79)
π+2 0.070 −0.084 0.139 −0.173 −0.178 −0.175
(0.35) (−0.41) (0.82) (−0.85) (−0.69) (−1.16)
π+3 0.050 0.130 0.280 −0.145 0.413 −0.129
(0.20) (0.59) (1.34) (−0.52) (1.34) (−0.44)
π+4 −0.016 −0.141 0.017 −0.108 0.369 −0.243
(−0.12) (−0.77) (0.12) (−0.41) (1.30) (−0.86)
π+5 −0.106 −0.129 −0.049 0.017 0.132 −0.163
(−0.89) (−0.63) (−0.40) (0.06) (0.35) (−0.74)
π+6 −0.054 −0.161 0.104 0.202 0.062 −0.521∗∗
(−0.44) (−1.07) (0.73) (0.79) (0.15) (−2.60)
Tenure 0.024 0.035 0.017∗∗ 0.029∗∗∗ 0.008 −0.051∗∗
(1.68) (1.77) (2.48) (3.02) (0.52) (−2.25)
Tenure2 −0.000 −0.001 −0.000 0.000 −0.000 0.001
(−1.58) (−1.28) (−1.61) (0.24) (−0.18) (1.60)
Constant 2.754∗∗∗ 2.287∗∗∗ 2.691∗∗∗ 3.892∗∗∗ 4.929∗∗∗ 4.770∗∗∗
(21.12) (19.33) (21.16) (31.93) (29.19) (23.42)
Obs. 1202 1202 1202 1202 1202 1202
R2 0.665 0.660 0.476 0.437 0.546 0.655
Fixed-effect OLS regression, t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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C Serial Correlation and Heteroskedasticity
C.1 Further Discussion
With event studies two concerns are serial correlation and heteroskedasticity of the disturbances.
These render the least squares estimator inefficient and even inconsistent if some regressors are
lagged dependent variables. Standard test statistics, such as the first-order autocorrelation coef-
ficient of the residual (coefficient 0.125, significant at 1 percent level), obtained from regressing
performance on individual characteristics (tenure and tenure2) and individual fixed effects, as
well as the DW-statistic for panel data, do indeed suggest that disturbances are positively cor-
related.27 Serial correlation is also detected when using the Woolridge test for autocorrelation
in panel data ( Wooldridge 2002, pp. 282–283) (p-value: .05 for H0: no first-order autocorrela-
tion). We also ran the modified Wald test for group-wise heteroskedasticity on the fixed effect
model and found a highly significant test statistic. Therefore, we reject the null hypothesis that
the panels in our model have common disturbance variances and that those disturbances are not
correlated with the regressors. Hence, adjustments need to be made. If the goal were to estimate
a model with complete dynamics, we needed to re-specify the model because strong serial cor-
relation is often an indication of omitting important explanatory variables or functional form
misspecification. However, as this was not our goal, we had to find a way to carry out statisti-
cal inference in light of this positive correlation and potential heteroskedasticity (Li and Hsiao
1998).
Bertrand et al. (2004) discuss serial correlation as a frequent problem, typically caused by
the use of a fairly long time series, the positive serial correlation in the dependent variable, and
the high degree of persistence of the intervention variable. They used Monte Carlo simulations
to investigate how several estimation techniques helped to solve this serial correlation prob-
lem. They found that allowing for an unrestricted covariance structure over time within groups,
with or without making the assumption that the error terms in all states follow the same pro-
cess, worked well when the number of groups (i.e., units to which the intervention is applied,
here: individuals) was greater than 50. This condition is satisfied in our sample. In addition, we
allow for an arbitrary variance-covariance matrix as we cluster on the team level. These vari-
ance estimates are robust in the sense of providing correct coverage rates to much more than
panel-level heteroskedasticity. In particular, they are robust to any type of correlation within the
observations of each panel/group. Moreover, Bertrand et al. (2004) show that, if the intervention
variable is not serially correlated, OLS standard errors are consistent, despite the positive serial
correlation in the residuals. This is true in this study where the average correlation of the award
27Second- and third-order autocorrelation coefficients are small (0.028 and 0.004) and insignificant.
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variable over time for each individual is −.05 (correlation coefficients vary between −.31 and
.47 with a mode and median of −.05).
To further check the robustness of the reported standard errors, we applied OLS with panel-
corrected standard errors (PCSE) assuming heteroskedastic and contemporaneously correlated
disturbances across panels (a method initially suggested by Beck and Katz 1995). The estimates
calculated with the Prais-Winsten FGLS ( Prais and Winsten 1954), assuming an AR(1) pro-
cess in the disturbances, do not differ in any meaningful way from the ones presented above.
The same holds, when we apply the Driscoll and Kraay standard errors for fixed effect models
(Driscoll and Kraay 1998). These standard errors are robust to general forms of cross-sectional
(spatial) and temporal dependence when the time dimension becomes large. Because this non-
parametric technique of estimating standard errors places no restrictions on the limiting behav-
ior of the number of panels, the size of the cross-sectional dimension in finite samples does
not constitute a constraint on feasibility—even if the number of panels is much larger than T .
Hence, we are confident that the standard errors reported in the table are roughly accurate.
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C.2 Regressions With Two-Way Clustering
Table C.1: Models with One-Way (Team-Month Basis) and Two-Way (Id andMonth) Clustering
Model 1a Model 1b Model 2a Model 2b
one-way two-way one-way two-way
π−6 −0.055 −0.055 −0.069 −0.069
(−0.54) (−0.53) (−0.67) (−0.62)
π−5 0.123 0.123 0.117 0.117
(1.37) (0.87) (1.31) (0.77)
π−4 0.100 0.100 0.098 0.098
(1.40) (1.25) (1.47) (1.18)
π−3 0.076 0.076 0.080 0.080
(0.76) (0.72) (0.84) (0.72)
π−2 −0.013 −0.013 −0.008 −0.008
(−0.13) (−0.12) (−0.09) (−0.07)
π−1 −0.028 −0.028 −0.020 −0.020
(−0.39) (−0.31) (−0.29) (−0.21)
π0 −0.034 −0.034 −0.022 −0.022
(−0.51) (−0.37) (−0.33) (−0.22)
π+1 0.234∗∗ 0.234∗∗ 0.246∗∗ 0.246∗∗
(2.73) (2.04) (2.96) (2.00)
π+2 0.015 0.015 0.035 0.035
(0.12) (0.12) (0.29) (0.25)
π+3 0.172 0.172 0.192 0.192
(1.03) (1.24) (1.19) (1.31)
π+4 −0.005 −0.005 0.017 0.017
(−0.05) (−0.06) (0.17) (0.16)
π+5 −0.050 −0.050 −0.022 −0.022
(−0.85) (−0.62) (−0.40) (−0.25)
π+6 0.005 0.005 0.033 0.033
(0.05) (0.05) (0.28) (0.29)
Tenure 0.013∗ 0.013∗ 0.009 0.009
(1.76) (1.83) (0.95) (0.82)
Tenure2 −0.000 −0.000 −0.000 −0.000
(−0.98) (−1.02) (−0.81) (−0.62)
Constant 3.209∗∗∗ 3.209∗∗∗ 3.228∗∗∗ 3.228∗∗∗
(37.29) (22.65) (34.91) (21.45)
Observations 1202 667
R2 0.576 0.563
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < .10, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
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